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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
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4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,))
5	Plaintiff,)) Criminal Action
6	v.) No. 1:21-cr-10256-IT) Pages 1 to 68
7	KINGSLEY R. CHIN, ADITYA HUMAD,) and SPINEFRONTIER, INC.,)
8	Defendants.
9)
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11	BEFORE THE HONORABLE M. PAGE KELLEY
12	UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13	FINAL STATUS CONFERENCE
14	(Digital Recording)
15	September 13, 2023
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1 PROCEEDINGS THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon, everyone. 2 MR. POLLACK: Good afternoon. 3 MR. DERUSHA: Good afternoon. 4 5 THE CLERK: Today is Wednesday, September 13th, 2023. 6 We are now on the record in criminal case number 21-10256, 7 United States versus Chin, et al., the Honorable M. Page Kelley presiding. 8 9 Will counsel please identify themselves for the 10 record. 11 MR. DERUSHA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. It's AUSA 12 David Derusha for the United States, and with me are AUSAs Patrick Callahan, Chris Looney, and Abe George. 13 14 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon. 15 MR. POLLACK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Barry Pollack on behalf of Dr. Kingsley Chin and Spinefrontier, Inc. 16 With me -- we're sharing a conference room and hopefully not 17 getting any feedback on this with each other. We've muted 18 19 one -- is Josh Solomon. 20 THE COURT: Okay. I'm not getting any feedback so 21 far. And good afternoon to you. 22 MR. FICK: Good afternoon, Your Honor. William Fick and Daniel Marx on behalf of defendant Aditya Humad, who is 23 also here on the Zoom. 24 25 THE COURT: All right. Good afternoon.

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1 MR. PABIAN: Your Honor, this is Michael Pabian here for intervenor Dr. Jason Montone. 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. Good afternoon to you. MR. PABIAN: Good afternoon. 5 THE COURT: Okay. I think that's everyone, right? 6 All right. So we're here, first of all, for the final 7 status conference, and I know you've been redirected to Judge Talwani. And given the outstanding motions, which I'm happy to hear argument on this afternoon, I thought we might continue 10 the final status conference to one last date of Monday, October 30th at 10:30 a.m., and I'm happy to hear the parties on the appropriateness of doing that. 12 13 Okay. Hearing nothing, I don't know if that means 14 it's not appropriate or appropriate, but anyway, I'm going to put this over to Monday, October 30th, at 10:30 for a -- go 15 ahead. 16 MR. CALLAHAN: Your Honor, Patrick Callahan for the 17 18 United States. Just wondering, is there any chance that that 19 could be in the afternoon? Only because I have an appearance 20 that morning. If not, I'm sure my colleagues could handle it, 21 but if it's possible, that would be great. 22 THE COURT: No problem at all. And is 2:00 o'clock 23 okay with everyone if we move it to then? Is that all right 24 with you, sir? 25 MR. CALLAHAN: That would be great for me, Judge

Kelley. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. We'll say 2:00 o'clock.

All right. So -- and I'm going to exclude the time.

So we have two motions. Number 107, which is defendants' motion to compel the government to provide discovery, and then number 108, which is the government's motion to compel. And I'm happy to start with 107. And I know that Dr. Montone has asserted his privilege over certain of the emails and other communications with his attorneys on the phone. And I know you're here, and I accept your assertion of that privilege. And I don't know, does your lawyer want to be heard any further on that?

MR. PABIAN: Yeah, Your Honor. I can be brief. So in short, Dr. Montone decided to seek intervention in this matter last week, upon seeing some of the defendants' briefs which argued that the government could not raise privilege issues here; and essentially what we're doing is we're seeking intervention in the matter and notifying the Court that in the event these documents are held to be within the scope of the discovery or obligations of the government, contrary to the arguments the government has made, that we do intend to assert privilege. And we believe that the remedy in that situation would be a privilege log, just as Judge Talwani held in the Gibson case that the defendants rely heavily on.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. And so I

think I'll hear from defendants about the question of the government needing to search Mr. Monotone's phone.

MR. POLLACK: Thank you, Your Honor, I think I'll be taking the lead on this argument. And I think I'll lead in some of the issues about the motion to intervene rather than try to take that on first because I think some of what gets covered relates to that.

But I'll start by referring to *United States versus*Gibson, which the party seeking intervention seeks to

characterize the holding as a remedy is a privilege log. It's

actually far from that in how that case developed. And my firm

represented the defendant that was seeking the material.

I think it's important to remember in that case it was actually a law firm server that was at issue which carried with it, I think largely, material that was irrelevant and would have many third parties claiming privilege who never took any voluntary act.

Here we've heard Dr. Montone turns over a phone for imaging, his counsel at the time, who is not counsel present here today, indicates at most the phrase "Please note. I'm the lawyer with regard to privilege." It contains no written agreement in response or anything that we've seen in the record that would set parameters or the sort of -- anything remotely like the sort of detailed protocol that appeared in the Gibson case to which the government and a law firm had agreed.

But I jump to the government's position because it starts even before remedy with the idea that despite holding and controlling the image of the phone, it's not in possession, custody, or control of that phone, and that just runs squarely against what not just Magistrate Judge Cabell had said but also Judge Talwani in that case, who said -- who adopted the Magistrate Judge's finding that holding it and controlling it is possession. You don't have to reach things like custody or -- but that that was enough to trigger the government's duties.

Now, jumping out from that opinion, once that ruling came, there was actually an agreement between the government and the defendant on how that would be searched, and efforts were actually made to craft something that would allow in that, I think, more unique circumstance of a law firm with many, many clients' materials on it on how to handle that. And the parties holding the privilege still did not have notice at that time. I don't think notice went out to every client that their materials had been turned over by their law firm to the government.

But here, the government, even more so than in *Gibson*, had notice of the *Gibson* ruling. They should know that when they take possession of items like this, and here they did so without a protocol, at most what they seem to have done -- we have an email from the government that somewhere around August

13th they informed Dr. Montone's counsel. I don't know if that was Mr. Pabian or the underlying counsel who was the conduit of information with the government during Dr. Montone's cooperation. But they told him that the material had been subject to a motion at that time. It had been requested for months earlier.

We don't know if that was conveyed by the government. Clearly there wasn't any kind of an agreement between the government to convey that information. As parties often do, if they turn something over to someone else, they let me know so I can object. This was just handed over to the cooperator saying here, but remember my name, please note, this is my name so that you can avoid privilege material, and again, no agreement. But that means that the intervenor has waited a month.

And the law is actually pretty clear. You don't just assert a privilege by saying I assert privilege or if you require me to, I'll assert privilege. A party has to make a timely objection and provide a privilege log, and we've provided case law. I don't think we have a full response to the motion to intervene, but we responded pretty quickly last night. And we've cited some of the case law in both this circuit and elsewhere that says it's not enough to make a vague reference, particularly whereas here we know that all of the material before -- I don't have the date in front of me, but I think it's in 2018, so late 2018 is what the charge of

obstruction runs through. I think it's December 2018. I don't know the exact date.

But the material that predates that, to the extent there is communications with counsel, it wouldn't be with Mr. Pabian. We're certainly not looking for communications that have happened in the past few weeks or whatever it may have been with Mr. Pabian. We are not looking for those things that occurred in the past several months in preparing a response to that request but those things that happened while that -- while Dr. Montone, as he has admitted through pleading guilty, obstructed justice by providing false documents, we believe from what we've read, at least in part, his efforts were using counsel as a conduit. And I believe the copy was made shortly after that.

We're talking about the plea is through December 2018. The copy I think is -- I think there's an email in January saying he was going to be in there sometime in 2019. So there wouldn't be many materials in the 2019 time frame. But we're talking about counsel getting used as a conduit. We cited case law about that. Obviously information is not privileged when it just reveals facts, not facts for the purpose of legal advice, scheduling information which can be relevant in this case, and I want to get into that as I talk about the Brady issues that permeate both of the categories of information that we seek in our motion to compel.

But, you know, there's obviously not a blanket claim and a privilege that can be everything that has my lawyer's name in it, which is what it says, "Please note. Here's my name and email address" is somehow privileged, which cried out, to the extent someone was trying to preserve privilege rights, for a privilege log here, but also a much more diligent effort to preserve the privilege rather than just gain points as a cooperator.

And let's face it, that's what's lurking here, right, is that Dr. Montone turned this over to help himself. He was seeking the affirmative benefit of making this information available without being that nuisance to the government that would insist on privilege through a detailed protocol agreement such as what appeared in *Gibson* where still -- Judge Talwani was not finished. I want to be clear, that even where it involved numerous other clients who had not yet had notice and had not yet been able to be heard that their information was sitting there. But anything that didn't make it on a log was getting turned over, and there was supposed to be a Part 2 to that.

And certainly the Part 2 here warrants being collapsed into Part 1 because there's been inadequate efforts to maintain the privilege. And there's so many categories, whether it's the use of the attorneys as the conduit, just facts, the crime fraud exception to the extent that these emails are furthering

information to the government, because anything that's about what's getting further to the government would affect the materiality of the obstruction of justice charge that -- to which Dr. Montone has pled guilty, and then scheduling type emails.

In addition, the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme Court has found with regard to each privilege, one at a time, that the Confrontation Clause overrides privilege and is important. So I'd say, Your Honor, if, to the extent there hasn't been a wholesale waiver by a choice, a strategic choice to benefit oneself by handing something over to the government with a note saying "Please note," not reaching an agreement that could protect the material, if that's not deemed a complete waiver, then all of this should be subject to an in-camera inspection.

I know we don't know the universe of these documents. I would suspect we're not talking about thousands of documents. We might be talking about dozens. The government would be in a better position or Mr. Pabian would be in a better position because this is an image, so his client would still have the original phone. So he should be aware of what he's asserting, which I wouldn't even call a genuine categorical assertion, right? It's categorical in the everything on the phone.

If it turns out you're thinking about turning this over, Your Honor, then I'm going to think about privilege some

more. It's not a categorical that says, hey, there's seven emails with background statements that are purely background that were given for my purposes as attorney. We're not seeing anything like that that can put this in context, but I do think that at the very least, and there's plenty of case law on this, an in-camera inspection is going to be necessary here in order to determine -- and this might be the time or it might be the time as I address the next category to talk about the scope of Brady material because we're talking about a witness who -- actually, let me just double-check the date of this.

I guess he did enter his plea after the -- after the -- that's it. The grand jury in this case, in its deep wisdom, carefully considering all the evidence that the government put before it, charged the conspiracy to run through at least June 2019. And we know that that's just an approximate, right? Because it's that sort of at least in or about, and I think the "at least" means it could go further with named and unnamed conspirators.

As I'm going to get into, Your Honor, the defendants are facing criminal charges about all their activities through that date, and that's several years of the government interacting with named and unnamed conspirators — alleged co-conspirators and witnesses which brings to the table a number of forms of *Brady* that we expect to see through these materials.

I think what I can do is sum this up now, and then when I talk about the joint investigation aspect, which is Part 2 of our motion, I can apply it to that. But as --

THE COURT: So, can I just interrupt you for a second? So maybe I'll just ask what -- either the government or the witness, what is the scope of the information the government has, kind of temporally? How big a -- how much data did the witness hand over to the government?

MR. CALLAHAN: Your Honor, I'll handle this piece unless Mr. Pabian would like to go first.

MR. PABIAN: No, that's fine. I would just ask for a few brief minutes to respond with some of those arguments that were raised with respect to Dr. Montone.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PABIAN: If I could do that afterwards.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CALLAHAN: Just to talk about I guess the scope of what was turned over, Your Honor, Dr. Montone -- an extraction and image of his phone was turned over, and the only materials that were held back from that image being turned over were the attorney-to-client communications between Dr. Montone and his criminal defense attorneys at the time. Again, we're not calling them attorney-client privileged materials. We're calling them attorney-client communications because we were not given the consent by Dr. Montone to review those. He

explicitly carved that out, and he said, I'm giving you these names of my criminal defense attorneys for the ex -- and he says, quote, "For the purposes of protecting any attorney-client privileged text messages or emails on the cell phone." Those are the only things that we held back, Your Honor.

And just to be clear, the only thing we're talking about are one-on-one communications between the attorneys, at the time it was John Kelly and Brian Healy, his two defense attorneys, and Dr. Montone. And that's one of the reasons -- I just want to make sure we're focused on the right thing, Your Honor.

And the volume, I'm not exactly sure what it is because we haven't -- again, we haven't looked at it. I would suspect it's not in the thousands, exactly like Mr. Pollack has said. But to put it in context, what we've produced is, and what we produced early, is Dr. Montone's, you know, all the interview reports of Dr. Montone, Dr. Montone's signed plea agreement, his grand jury testimony, the exhibits attendant to his grand jury testimony, and the entire document production.

THE COURT: Okay. Sure. So I know you've been really liberal with the discovery, but just focusing for a minute on the information from the phone, what's the time span of the information on the phone? When does it start and when does it end?

MR. CALLAHAN: I don't have a specific time when it starts, Your Honor. I know the date it was imaged, which we understand it was early February 2019.

THE COURT: Okay. And when you say "we've handed over everything except the one-on-one communications with his criminal defense lawyers," does that mean you've given over the entire contents of his phone except for those?

MR. CALLAHAN: Yes, Your Honor. So it's a Cellebrite report and a forensic report of what's on the phone. So we turned that over, and we said when we turned it over, Your Honor, and that was June 2022, I believe, we turned it over, and we explicitly called this out to make sure, you know, counsel knew what we were doing and what we felt we could turn over and what was in our possession, and that was everything but those communications that Dr. Montone had explicitly carved out from his consent.

You know, going beyond that could have been a Fourth

Amendment violation, Your Honor, and also, we're precluded from

doing that. We're precluded from looking at the

attorney-client communications, particularly when someone puts

us on notice and says in here are my attorney-client

communications with my defense counsel.

THE COURT: Sure. So I understand that you had an agreement with Dr. Montone not to look at those things, but I do think, especially in light of the *Gibson* case, you're kind

of treading on very thin ice by taking the whole thing into your possession. I mean, I wonder if it wouldn't have been simpler for him to give it to you without the attorney-client communications in it. Because I do think it's kind of a fiction that you don't possess them now, and I think that's what Gibson stands for and Judge Talwani endorsed that idea.

MR. CALLAHAN: No, I --

THE COURT: Yeah, so I think they are in your possession. You agreed not to review them, but I think the way you agreed not to review his attorney-client communications doesn't guarantee that they're all privileged. I think that's the problem.

MR. CALLAHAN: Right. No, I understand --

THE COURT: You don't know because you didn't look at them.

MR. CALLAHAN: Right.

THE COURT: So one of the things I would like to know is how many of those communications are there, and if there's not a huge number of them, I will look at them ex parte and see if they contain *Brady* as best I can. I've done that in other cases, looked at things that -- myself, and I'll get some maybe ex parte communications from the defense concerning what they think would be helpful.

I think Attorney Pollack was about to go through those factors, but I'm happy to take a detailed ex parte

communication and -- but I don't know if there's -- I mean, I don't -- I don't know how many years of information you have. If it stops in 2019, I don't know when it starts, but I can't imagine he had thousands of communications with his lawyers.

MR. CALLAHAN: I would expect that's correct, Your Honor, and I don't want to waste the Court's time, but if I could have a word about Gibson --

THE COURT: Go right ahead.

MR. CALLAHAN: -- before we move on? And I understand. You know, I can take a hint.

As to Gibson, though, I think it is important to keep a few things in mind about Gibson and the holding and what's at issue. And in Gibson, if you look at the transcripts, what they were looking for in Gibson, if you look at the transcript of that hearing, Judge Cabell -- and it's docket 75 and it's at page 10. Judge Cabell is pretty explicit with defense counsel Marty Weinberg, and he says, "Mr. Weinberg, you indicated that you were not interested in any communications between Behman," who's a witness in that case, someone who the government had met with, as I understand it also someone who had counsel, and what Judge Cabell said was "Mr. Weinberg, you indicated that you were not interested in any communications between Behman and his counsel, and I just happen to note that. So I've noted here that we would specifically be excluding from any information that would need to be produced those documents

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involving communications between Behman," who was a witness in that case," and his counsel. And I think that is an important distinction here, Your Honor. And again, I'm not going to try to turn you around on *Gibson*, but I also think that makes it very different from what we're having here because the exact thing Judge Cabell is carving out here, the communications between the witness in *Gibson* and his own defense attorney are what we're talking about, and Judge Cabell takes that out of the equation in our view.

And I think that's also consistent, Your Honor, with, you know, the decision in Parnas where they say how can -- you know, the government with information and documents are in the possession of a filter team, as they describe in Parnas. Parnas was a search warrant. The returns went back to the government. They were with the government. There was a special master, absolutely. However, it was executed by the government. It was in the possession of the government, and what the court said was documents that are in possession of the filter team and not accessible to the case team, which is exactly what we're dealing with here, are not subject to the Rule 16 -- are not subject to those Rule 16 discovery obligations, and I think that between the Parnas decision, Your Honor, and the difference that we have here between the scenario that -- or not the difference. You know, the actual, you know, the similarity here in our case where we have

Dr. Montone and his criminal defense attorney, those communications aren't carved out, and Judge Cabell himself, with the defense counsel who's arguing this motion, says, I want you to know, we're excluding -- I'm not interested in the communications between the witness and the counsel. And I just think that -- I think we should take that into account, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Sure. And I think those are great points, and thank you for raising them. But, for example, in a situation where you have a tank team looking at something, if they're looking to exclude, say, attorney-client communications but they see one that isn't privileged because there's some other person copied on it or because as, you know, for all these many exceptions that the defense points out in their briefing here, then that would get turned over, right? The tank team is just pulling out privileged communications.

And what I understand the defense to be saying here is you don't know if those emails that you were directed or texts that you were directed not to look at actually are technically all privileged, right?

MR. CALLAHAN: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I mean, that's my understanding.

MR. CALLAHAN: No, that's absolutely correct.

THE COURT: And I think they were just wanting you, notwithstanding your agreement with the witness, to go through

all those sensitive emails and see are they actually *Brady*.

Like, are they not privileged and can be turned over or should be turned over. So --

MR. CALLAHAN: Just one --

THE COURT: Yes, go ahead.

MR. CALLAHAN: Sorry, Your Honor. Go ahead. Just one point about that is, and I think what we saw at the end of *Gibson* and the remedy in *Gibson* was -- very explicitly from Judge Talwani was let the holder of the privilege do that, right? And if they want to give that back to us, whatever is not privileged, and give that back to the government and say this is not privileged, and then we can review it for, you know, anything, you know, *Brady*, *Giglio*, or any of those local rules, we would of course do that.

What we don't want to do is, number one, their consent; number two, a privilege that we don't hold. And we can't ask them to waive it, Your Honor. You know, the department explicitly directs us, you may not ask a party for a waiver.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. CALLAHAN: We're told not to do that, and we didn't do that. And we were very clear. I mean, from the beginning we were very clear of what we were going to produce and what we couldn't produce, and it does sound like Mr. Pabian is here to assert that. I don't know if his attention is to do

a privilege log or not do a privilege log, but we will review anything that is deemed not to be privileged. And I think Mr. Pabian or counsel who is working with Dr. Montone at the time is likely in the best situation to determine what the privilege is because sometimes it follows up, I would imagine, that you're following up on conversations that you've had not over text message or, you know, following a phone call. And I think it probably takes some coordination between counsel for Dr. Montone and Dr. Montone himself to determine what is privileged.

And we agree. A blanket assertion of privilege, you know, the case law is clear about that. And I don't think that's -- you know, that's not what we're saying. We're just saying we can't even access it yet. They are in a position to do that and make that determination. We are more than willing to review the material after they take out their attorney-client privileged material that they deem as such and turn it over.

THE COURT: Sure. Okay. Okay. Let me hear from Dr. Montone's lawyer.

MR. PABIAN: Yes, Your Honor. So on the preliminary point of the government's possession, custody, or control, we agree with the government that these materials are not within its possession for discovery purposes.

You know, it bears repeating that Dr. Montone's phone

was provided to the government by consent. There was no warrant or other legal process requiring its production, and that consent was explicitly limited.

Now, contrary to the defense argument, that message did not simply say note my name. It said, and I quote, at docket 110-1, "For purposes of protecting any attorney-client privileged text messages or emails on his cell phone, please note the following phone numbers and email addresses," and it has the information for his two attorneys. So in those circumstances, Your Honor, it's our position that the Fourth Amendment prohibits a government search from extending beyond those parameters that allowed the government access.

THE COURT: But here's the problem. You've got

Dr. Montone's intentions in handing that over to the government

but then you have these conflicting obligations the government

has in a criminal case once he becomes a witness and they're in

possession of his phone, and I just think his lawyer should

have thought of that. I know it's a bit of a chess game, but I

do think when you're working on behalf of a government witness,

you're always aware of the fact that everything you say and do

is going to get turned over -- I mean, or at least scrutinized

to see if it's going to get turned over.

So I just think -- I think this doesn't happen very often. There isn't much in the case law about this because I don't think people do this very often.

MR. PABIAN: Perhaps not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: They give the government something as sensitive as an image of their phone and say please don't look at certain parts of this and don't, you know, think forward to discovery. So I think that's why we're missing a lot of case law on this.

MR. PABIAN: If I could simply just make two really quick points, understanding the Court's leanings on that issue.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PABIAN: The first is, frankly, I think because this was a Fourth Amendment search and limited by consent, the government is not in lawful possession of those messages. I think the government has told the Court here today that it doesn't believe it has lawful authority to look at those.

The second point is with respect to *Gibson*. You know, the defendants rely on the protocol agreement in that case but neglect to note that that protocol agreement did allow the government to, quote, access the entire server in the event of a subsequent criminal proceeding. There's no similar permission granted in this case on that point.

And then just shifting gears a little bit -- so that's the preliminary issue, right, is whether these are within the scope of discovery. The secondary issue, if the Court rules against the government on that point, is what's the remedy.

And again, we think, just as Judge Talwani held in Gibson, it's

a privilege log. And again, as the government noted in its argument, the sole materials we're talking about here,

Dr. Montone's communications with his counsel, were off the table from square one in *Gibson*.

So I think it's important to be really clear about what the defendants are asking. They're asking this Court to order the government to review all of Dr. Montone's communications with his criminal defense counsel --

THE COURT: Sure, but I don't think we're going to do that. I think what would happen is I would ask the government to extract the emails that they deemed not to be in their possession, the ones, you know, that were listed by your client, and see how many of those are there, and then not review them but turn them over either to you for -- to create a privilege log or -- and/or to me to look at them and see if any of them constitute *Brady*. So you don't happen to know when the communications on the phone began, do you?

MR. PABIAN: I don't, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. PABIAN: But that's certainly information we can get if we're ordered to do so. You know, with respect to those two options, without waiving our arguments on the preliminary point, we do think that the appropriate remedy is a privilege log process. You know, the defendants — there's a burden that needs to be met for in-camera review, for a party to be

entitled to in-camera review.

With respect to the crime fraud exception, which the defendants have raised here, there's Supreme Court case law on point, Zolin, and that's at 491 U.S. 554. The defendants don't cite that case. They don't try to make the type of showing that's required by that case. And instead, they really fail to articulate any specific basis at all to believe there are material communications.

The cases that they've cited on that issue, on the notion that the privilege can be overridden here by defendants' Constitutional rights, are clearly distinguishable. By and large they involve specific materials that have been identified as highly material to the case.

In *Murdoch v. Castro*, it was a letter by the witness to counsel, a specific letter, that exonerated the defendant. You know, we don't have any showing like that here. And it's our view --

THE COURT: Let me just say, with regard to Brady, the government has an obligation just simply to review all the materials in its possession for Brady, and I just think this very peculiar fact situation here is they happen to be taking the witness's direction about what they should not look at, and so they have not looked at certain things, accepting that those things are privileged. We don't really know if they are or not.

And I do think the defendants -- Brady does not require that you say we happen to know there's a letter in this there exonerating our client.

MR. PABIAN: Yes.

THE COURT: So you know, I just think -- this is a very odd fact situation, and I haven't ever seen anything like this before. But I do think -- I'm going to go back and look at *Parnas* again, and I'll read the transcript of the other case just to make sure I really do understand the facts there.

But at least right now my intention is to say that these materials are in the government's possession, and if they are truly privileged, they should not be turned over. If it's -- if it's this man asking or receiving legal advice from his lawyer, that's obviously protected. But if there is *Brady* information in there and it's not privileged, we need to know. So I don't know.

Mr. Pollack, do you want to say anything more about this?

MR. POLLACK: I do because I think the *Gibson* case has been mischaracterized a bit by people who weren't a part of it. And I can say that the issue that was before Judge Talwani there — and I think in ways Mr. Callahan referred to this but spun it in a way — there wasn't a concern by defendants about getting more than that privilege log there. Here there is. Here we're looking for specific *Brady* material. Behman was not

the person who turned over his communications. A law firm turned over its server, right? It was a different setting.

And where the parties were able to guide the remedy, one thing that's certainly not in *Gibson* is Judge Talwani saying, oh, it would be a big error for Magistrate Judge Cabell to have done an in-camera inspection. That doesn't appear there. In the right setting, that's the easiest remedy, right? That takes — that creates the least amount of issues here while safeguarding *Brady* rights.

Because what we do know is from what the government has turned over, to the extent we take their representations at face value, it would appear that -- if I can get an exact date, I think -- Dr. Montone's first visit to their office was -- actually, I have 2018. I don't know -- what's that?

MR. SOLOMON: December.

MR. POLLACK: Right. So we'd expect there would be some advice leading up to that. We'd expect that there might be a relay, a conduit, as we've cited in the case law, of facts such as the government wants to hear if you'll say this. It's not legal advice. That's referring to what the government has said, and I understand why the government might not want us to get that, but that's clear *Brady* material in the category we've cited of unreliability of the government investigation.

I really want to remind Your Honor, unlike in *Gibson* here, the grand jury has decided to indict a conspiracy period

through at least December -- June 2019, and we have to defend that. And we have government actors all over the place by then for a couple of years getting their fingers and voice and ears all over people who the grand jury has decided could be actual or potential, named or unnamed, known or unknown coconspirators, and we have to defend against that through the -- not just a very important mens rea defense in terms of all the kinds of things that normally happen, but government actors permeating the events at issue through the charged conspiracy period, which, you know, I think the grand jury has essentially, in some ways, left open the possibility that a jury could find that Dr. Montone was a conspirator through some date in the charged conspiracy.

It's important to us to know what the government has influenced at some point, to know if Dr. Montone would not share any possible goals of other people who are allegedly culpable in the action because that could remove one potential co-conspirator, which we're allowed to do as part of our theory of defense.

Finally, I'd say with regard to the burden to do an in-camera inspection, the case law is really clear. It's very light of what it takes for an in-camera inspection because it's not considered intrusive to do an in-camera inspection. It's considered protective, Your Honor. And it probably goes without saying we have a lot more faith in Your Honor deciding

whether something is privileged or fits within exception or constitutes <code>Brady</code> than we would in a tank team doing it somewhere or even Dr. Montone's counsel, who, you know, this is going to slow down this case by months if it goes that way.

When I think -- I am taking an educated guess that we're going to see at most dozens of emails, not -- certainly not thousands and not hundreds. You know, there will be --

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to take another look at everything, and then I'll try to make a ruling very shortly, within the next few days, on this, but -- and I'll do something in writing but not a huge long order. Okay. So I --

MR. CALLAHAN: Your Honor, could I follow up, and this is just the last point, and if you want to move on, I can skip it.

THE COURT: It's okay.

MR. CALLAHAN: But the only comment I had is I understand the in-camera review and the desire for that, and I've seen that and we see that as a step when people are challenging a privilege log. It does seem consistent with what the remedy was in *Gibson* that — that the, you know, the holder of the privilege create a privilege log, gives it to defendants, and then, you know, if there are, if there is follow-up, they are in a position to challenge that and those — you know, we can — that can go before the court.

There can be an in-camera review here in that

instance, but I'm not sure why, just looking even at the case law in the light most favorable to the defendants here, why we would be doing something beyond *Gibson* when I think, what we believe, *Gibson* isn't. You know, it's unique and distinct for those reasons, and there is another case out there that, you know, goes the other way.

THE COURT: So I do just think that in this case where you have a witness who has a motive to side with the government and help the government, it's a bit different than the privilege holder in *Gibson*. But anyway, I'll give that some thought, and I appreciate your argument on that.

MR. PABIAN: Your Honor, could I have two sentences on that point, and I apologize, on behalf of Dr. Montone.

THE COURT: Yes. Go right ahead.

MR. PABIAN: I just want to note that respectfully there is an intrusion on the privilege that's caused by the requirement to turn over privileged documents to a court. That's why there are cases like *Zolin* requiring a specific showing that the defendants haven't addressed here.

You know, so with that, we'll rest on our arguments, but we do -- we do prefer the resolution of a privilege log, and we think that's the appropriate resolution.

THE COURT: Okay. And let -- I'll take a look at the Zolin case, but another possibility is that you produce a very descriptive privilege log and then we don't need to have an ex

parte -- I mean, we can take it one step at a time and do the privilege log and see if that's sufficient. I mean, it may be there's very few communications here, and they're very clearly privileged, right?

MR. PABIAN: Yes, I would agree that that's how it should work, is that we would produce a privilege log and the defendants be free to challenge any entries on that privilege log that they see fit.

THE COURT: I will just say, in my somewhat limited experience in looking through materials for exculpatory evidence that fits the *Brady* rubric, it's much better to have some indication from the defendant as to what their theory of the case is and what might help them, like Mr. Pollack's description of the co-conspirators, et cetera, just now. And I don't think they'd be inclined to provide you with that. So, you know, that's one consideration here.

But it's a little bit strange that we really have no idea what we're talking about because you weren't the lawyer, and I don't think you know what those communications hold. So let's -- maybe we'll just take it one step at a time like that. But anyway, okay.

MR. POLLACK: Your Honor, just really briefly on that because I think it needs to go directly to the in-camera review not only for the timing of this but that's the only way to comply with *Brady* here. We know that Judge Talwani has found

in a setting like this -- I think the government has to concede that to the extent that Judge Talwani's statement of the law is correct, that this is in their possession, it needs to be reviewed for *Brady*.

What we're doing is actually excusing the government from the conflict it created for itself by allowing -- not allowing -- but by having Your Honor allow it to be done by you, and that solves the issue. You know, I've always wondered tank teams when they do that, they're violating the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct by looking at privileged materials. But you know what? The Confrontation Clause, Compulsory Process Clause actually override those types of concerns.

So Your Honor's -- I think it's been close to an offer of potential proposal to review what should be a limited number of documents in camera solves the problem -- the dilemma that the government has created by post *Gibson* taking in a phone rather than having it imaged without those, and I guess, indicating it and letting us fight it out the other way. But I think otherwise it's a *Brady* violation that continues if this isn't reviewed by an appropriate party. There's just no way that Dr. Montone and his counsel is authorized to make *Brady* determinations but Your Honor is. I leave it on that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me just say one thing, which

is, I'm going to ask the government to somehow figure out how many communications we are talking about and to email counsel and Mr. Vieira with that information when you can get it. And that would be helpful if I could have that maybe in the next 48 hours or so. I won't hold you firmly to that, but if you can just figure out what is the universe of material that we're talking about.

MR. CALLAHAN: Absolutely.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay.

So number 2, interactions between the criminal and civil team. So I really think you have an uphill battle on this one, Mr. Pollack.

MR. POLLACK: It is, but I bring up the -- I think now is the time when I can give the other several categories of Brady material, and this flows from what I've already raised about the fact that part of the charged conduct involves a time period when the government was interacting with -- I think Your Honor probably has enough of the background -- you know, surgeons who were parties to consulting agreements, many of whom had their own lawyers, at least as of the time of contracting.

THE COURT: So let me just say, you want all the communications between the civil and criminal teams about these surgeons, but the government is representing that it has looked through everything for *Brady* and there is none. So -- yeah.

MR. POLLACK: I've heard that sentence once or twice or 40 times before that we know what *Brady* is and we've done it and taken care of. I think what Your Honor is referring to is on page 14 of their opposition where they call the request moot because they've done the functional equivalent of what we're asking for. We disagree. And in part that's because I think there's been — there had to have been under the circumstances of what we've seen in discovery a gross underestimate of what constitutes *Brady* material in a case like this, which has all of the usual mens rea issues.

So obviously anything that would indicate Dr. Chin or anyone at the company, to the extent the company is charged, acted believing what they were doing was genuine, I think the government would say it's aware of that. And I think the government would say it's looked through what it's looked through, which may not be everything, but it's looked through what it's looked through for those kinds of things.

But, Your Honor, it's much broader here, and I start with what I raised -- and I would go in more detail in an ex parte submission, but I'm comfortable giving some categories to Your Honor to understand the sort of breadth of *Brady* as we see it.

So the government charges that these contracts with consultants were a sham, and they attack in part the structure of them. So the extent that they're interacting, and I think

it takes on significance that they're interacting with the alleged co-conspirator surgeon consultants during what the grand jury has said is the conspiracy period. Anything in which the surgeons, and I think almost all of them indicated at one time or another that the -- that the contracts were genuine and that they performed under them, that the government may also agree -- well, to the extent anyone said this is real, we've turned that over. But it goes beyond that.

And this is that the government is conducting this -what we believe is a joint investigation, Your Honor, not
characterized best as a parallel, but it's a joint
investigation in which there was communication about witnesses
and about how to deal with witnesses and what the requirements
were going to be to resolve things with witnesses during the
alleged conspiracy period as set by the grand jury.

So when -- I don't know that the government would have agreed that whenever a surgeon takes on some accountability and says in certain ways I didn't perform, each and every way that happens is also *Brady*, because the theory of defense here could be this was all genuine. Another layer of it is this is not only genuine but there are lawyers appearing for different parties, including the company, including some of the surgeon consultants. This is something that even if a problem developed and the surgeons didn't actually perform as intended, it's the surgeons' or consultants' fault. Then we're also

entitled to any communications that show the presence of lawyers during the conspiracy period.

So whatever emails the government is having about internally and externally involving lawyers for any of the alleged co-conspirators during the charged conspiracy period, and I still find the timing of the investigation -- not the timing of the investigation, but the timing of some active investigation during the conspiracy period as creating an uphill battle for the government here because they're influencing people -- one of our defenses can be, by that time that person is acting as a government agent. That person is cooperating with the government so a jury cannot find that our client conspired with that person because there was not a shared objective.

So you have the presence of lawyers for any of these parties. So when the government is saying so and so lawyered up, that's Brady material. When they lawyered up and the government became aware of it, it affects the government's investigation, when the government does say something to someone, one of these surgeon consultants, if you resolve the civil case you avoid the criminal case, and that involves lawyers present. That helps this defendant during the charged conspiracy period, that was what was going on with some people. Then you have just the general.

We cited to some cases about this in our reply on -- I

think it's in footnote 3. I think it's on page 16 -- my handwriting looks like 18 -- of our reply. And this seems particularly appropriate in a case like this where the grand jury has charged that kind of a time period. A party is free, says the Supreme Court, to attack the law enforcement's -- examining the law enforcement on good, effective knowledge of someone's statements and attack the reliability of the investigation in failing to even consider someone's guilt, and that could be that one of their cooperators is the only guilty party and someone is doing that.

But when they start by demonstrating knowledge of self-incriminating statements, the defense laid a foundation for a vigorous argument that law enforcement would be guilty of negligence. We're allowed to say that, how they handled these witnesses was inappropriate, whether because the government was saying resolve a civil case by admitting one, two and three, or one, and there will be no criminal charges.

We cite to another case there that has that same sort of weaknesses in a government's investigation here during the charged period, which makes it somewhat unique. We've cited to Judge Saris in the Wu case on page 15 of our opening brief, 210 Westlaw 817324, consider the theory of the defense balancing the government's claim of entitlement to have inter- and intra-agency communications with our right -- that defendant's right to prepare a defense, and Judge Saris said has to be

turned over. There might be limits on further disclosure but it gets to the -- you know, it gets to the defense to use -- to advance the theory of the case.

So I'm not -- I'm quite certain the government hasn't detailed its awareness of the various forms of Brady that I've outlined and more that we would supplement with Your Honor, but, you know, I understand that there's a general category of when people say nice enough things about the defendants we consider it Brady. They also have not identified what they reviewed. They reviewed the file. They didn't say they went through the intra- and interagency communications, and I think that's extremely important here, Your Honor, at least to the extent that they occurred during the charged period and involved anyone who's a potential named or -- I'm sorry -- known or unknown co-conspirator.

And the grand jury, you know, we often, as defendants, have to hear how independent the grand jury is in a way that can impact defendant's rights. But here the grand jury has to be deemed a party that set the parameters of the charges, and it set those charges to include a period in which the government was interacting extensively with people who would fit within the phrase "known and unknown co-conspirators." And I think a great deal of our defense will involve or could involve -- I don't have to promise that at this stage, but it's certainly preparing the defense to involve assessing every step

the government took with alleged known/unknown, named/unnamed co-conspirators during the charged period which ran at least, the words are at least through June 2019.

And I can say during that time AUSA Derusha and AUSA George had appeared in the civil case that was pending. They did that back in the -- AUSA George in 2015, AUSA Derusha I think on June 6th, 2018, and then they proceeded after that with -- and since their appearance there, there have been five interviews of Dr. Montone alone, and that's one of, I can say many or several of surgeons.

Another one, Jeffrey Carlson, on July 27th, 2018, an FBI agent, AUSA George and AUSA Derusha interviewed him, and not until, I think it's almost more than a year and a half later, AUSA Derusha and AUSA George file in a civil case an intent to intervene in the qui tam action, and it's only a month or so or more after that when they withdraw and make themselves just part of the criminal investigations they were doing. But certainly up until then there hadn't been that sort of spit -- steady space that would involve something that's parallel as opposed to joint.

I understand the FBI may only have worked on the criminal aspect of it, but I would think that the people at HHS, from what we've seen, might have people -- it would be expected to have people on both the civil and criminal. So we haven't received the kind of information -- I break this into

two categories. One, I think the government hasn't done enough, even close, to meet its *Brady* requirements. Separate or related to that, we cite to *Bases*, *Martoma*, *Mahaffy* on pages 16 and 17 of our opening brief with the kind of information the Court will often request from the government in order to better assess this issue. So we don't know what the government means when it said it looked through the files for *Brady* so this is moot. Did they actually look at the communications with all counsel for potential witnesses? The mere fact that they're lawyered up is *Brady*.

I've seen many a case defended on the fact that there are enough lawyers there someone couldn't have thought something was fraudulent because no lawyers were jumping up and down yelling anything. Everyone has heard that. There are times the government doesn't charge when there are this many lawyers this close to events, let alone involve themselves in the charged time period that the grand jury has determined.

So I would ask Your Honor to look at the types of information required, and we reiterated from those or drawn from those what's relevant in this case and in our conclusion, but certainly more is required of the government in terms of justifying what, here it seems a fair inference, was a joint investigation, not a parallel investigation. Even in parallel investigations this kind of information has been required to understand what really needs to be done so that we can defend

ourselves against allegations that we, meaning our clients, were conspiring with people during a time period when they were interacting with the government extensively and that lawyers were interacting with the government extensively, and we're entitled not just to know that generally, but we're entitled to defend ourselves against very serious charges because we do know the record contains information that there were -- there was a mix of how to resolve one case and another, that if you -- this is in Attorney Orkand's declaration at paragraph 8 that one witness's counsel said that he was told if they resolved the civil case he can avoid criminal charges.

So we know this has been mixed and matched, and we're entitled to the government actually going through what it has including intra- and interagency communications, not just so we get a taste of it but so that we could make effective use on cross-examination of what actually exists and what actually happened in there that caused virtually every surgeon to go from saying this is real, my attorney said it was okay, to eventually after enough interaction with the government some of them saying, okay, it wasn't real.

And we're entitled to explore that for the weaknesses, for the improprieties in the government's investigation, and to cross-examine -- not just cross-examine but -- it's not cross-examine the issues, it's the actual events that the grand jury has chosen to charge, the time period of it, when the

government was so extensively interacting.

So we'd ask for both a more extensive and adequate Brady search and report to the Court with details about what they did, not just that it's moot because they have done the functional equivalent, and we'd ask for the type of relief we've drawn from Bases, Martoma, Mahaffy on pages 16 and 17 of our opening brief on the kinds of information about who worked on what, when, and their interaction with these witnesses.

And even if someone who was civil and criminal at one point but then becomes only criminal is communicating where there's a civil attorney and saying there's a problem with this witness, I'm not so sure that's work product in the middle of the charged period, but certainly they've got detail to say, this witness is saying X, and we want that witness to say Y. Anything in that direction we're certainly entitled to, and I don't think they've even made that kind of a search through their own communications and the communications of the agents that were involved in underlying events with people who could be considered by a jury to be known or unknown co-conspirators charged by the grand jury, Your Honor.

So I think while an uphill battle, I think we meet it, and I think the government, given the type of charge the grand jury has put in here, has its uphill battle, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I'll hear from the government.

MR. DERUSHA: Thank you, Your Honor.

There are a few important points that I want to emphasize this afternoon. I know we've been going for a while, but I want to begin with an example that defense counsel explained with one of the surgeons that settled civilly with the government because I think it illustrates the fundamental misunderstanding that the defendants have or at least purport to have in connection with this piece of their motion to compel.

Dr. Carlson is a surgeon that settled civilly with the government. And Mr. Pollack describes a meeting that Dr. Carlson had with the government who was at that meeting. And how does he know that? He knows that because we produced the report of that meeting. That report notes the counsel that was present, the statements that were made by Dr. Carlson. And he knows those things because we provided them to him and did not shield the civil investigation from the search for discovery material, Brady material, anything else that they're entitled to under the discovery rules in the criminal case.

Foundationally, I want to go back to sort of the basics here which is that the government has conducted a joint investigation that had both a civil and a criminal component. The government has been transparent about the fact that this joint investigation had both a civil and criminal component from the outset in 2017 and at every step of the way since.

I think Your Honor is right that the defendants have

an uphill battle in showing that they're entitled to more than what the government has already produced. It's well-settled law, Your Honor.

I think you're familiar with the cases that we cited in the briefs, but just to touch on them briefly, it's well settled that there's nothing improper about the government undertaking simultaneous criminal and civil investigations or of undertaking simultaneous criminal and civil enforcement actions. The Ninth Circuit recognized that in *Stringer*, the DC Circuit recognized that in *Dresser*, and most importantly, perhaps, *Kordel*, the Supreme Court case in 1970, recognized that in saying that it would stultify the enforcement of federal criminal law to require a government agency invariably to choose either to --

THE COURT: I don't think I'm going to accept the fact that it was improper for the government to engage in a simultaneous civil and criminal investigation. So that's fine. I accept that.

But I guess the question really is, given the facts of this case and what Attorney Pollack says about the time period that the charges cover as indicted by the grand jury, and then that's the same time period in which you're interviewing these witnesses and settling out a criminal case, you know, telling Dr. Carlson he doesn't need to be charged criminally, blah-blah, what was your *Brady* search during that time?

MR. DERUSHA: Yeah, I appreciate the framing, Your Honor. I think we said this to the defendants in our discovery correspondence, we've said it in our opposition, we'll say it again now. For purposes of Brady and Rule 16, the government did not draw any distinction whatsoever between the criminal and the civil aspects of the investigation, or to put it differently, the government has searched the files of attorneys, of staff, of law enforcement agents, or anybody else who worked on civil aspects of the joint investigation or criminal aspects of the joint investigation.

THE COURT: And when you say "attorneys," you mean the doctors' attorneys emailing you, you emailing each other, et cetera?

MR. DERUSHA: Your Honor, what I mean is that what we have done here is the same thing that happens in any run-of-the-mill criminal case. There is an investigation, and the government conducts a review of that single investigation's files for any discoverable material, including Brady material. Here there was a joint investigation. There was joint fact-finding, and we have searched the files of that investigation. We have never contended, the government has never contended that it could shield the civil components of the investigation from that search for materials wherever they may be found, whoever they may involve.

And so it doesn't make any more sense here to conduct

the kind of evidentiary hearing or to rummage through the communications of the lawyers who are litigating the case or the civil case than it would in any run-of-the-mill criminal case. We are not contending that there is a separate body of information that we have no obligation to --

THE COURT: So I think what they specifically seem to be focusing on are the interactions between the criminal and civil teams, and I guess a lot of that is going to be work product and it's going to be protected and you get to discuss your case with your colleagues, obviously, and not have that be discoverable.

But I guess they're just asking, and it has been a very long investigation, and it seems to be involving a lot of people being questioned about what they did, and then they change their stories and so on.

And I just wonder, have you gone through the emails of the team members, including law enforcement, but also the different attorneys, and scoured that for *Brady*?

MR. DERUSHA: Your Honor, we have conducted the same review that we do in every case, which includes all information that we're aware of. And again, I want to emphasize what the -- what the defendants have and how this has played out with respect to settling surgeons, including Dr. Carlson, because I think this is illustrative of the reality and not just arguments about, you know, potential information that they

think that we haven't searched for despite our repeated assurance that we have searched for that kind of information.

The defendants know about -- with respect to any civilly settling parties, they know if those settlements resulted in written agreements because we produced copies of them. If there was an interview or a meeting with the witness, we produced a report of that.

THE COURT: That's all typically produced. But I don't know that there's any allegation that you've withheld meetings or that type of thing. What I thought Attorney Pollack was kind of focusing on was the interaction between the civil and criminal teams, and I know you're entitled to protect your work product and I'm not suggesting you get at that, but I do just want to make sure that that's been searched for Brady.

I think as these cases develop, sometimes, you know, you do have an ongoing obligation, and I'm not suggesting that's all you do in preparing a case, but I think, as motions like this get filed, sometimes it comes into focus a little bit more what the defense is seeking to use at trial and that type of thing. And I do think you have an obligation, especially if there's a fairly specific request like this, to make sure you've looked. And what I hear you saying is we do what we do in every case, and I don't really hear you saying, yes, we've done that, what you're specifically asking about.

MR. DERUSHA: Your Honor, we have searched for Brady

material that includes through emails. If we discover information that has not been produced but it's *Brady* material, we're aware of our ongoing obligation and would abide by our ongoing obligation.

But the key point, though, is this, when there is a joint investigation, because that's really what the motion is arguing, is that there's an additional obligation. And what I'm saying is that we understand there's an additional obligation. That's to broaden the scope of where you look or at least not to shield off part of the investigation under, you know, for the reasons that it was civil or that it was a different government agency conducting that piece of the investigation, and we have not done that.

And I think that the -- well, the defendants' papers go far beyond just searching for, you know, email communications the way that Your Honor just phrased it. They want all of our communications with one another. They want an affidavit describing every communication that we've had with one another.

THE COURT: I don't think that -- I don't think that's required, and I've never seen that required in a case. And I appreciate your transparency. I mean, I did recently have an SEC case where the government went to great pains to keep the investigation separate from the criminal case, and there was very little overlap and very little searching for Brady, and so

I think it's great what you've done.

I do think they have a rather advanced view of what Brady constitutes -- you know, what constitutes Brady here.

And I hope you will keep looking as you hear from them what they consider to be important to their defense. I'm not going to order you to provide every -- an affidavit with every communication in it. I don't think that's required. I'll take another look at the pleadings because these -- I know we just got something late last night that I only read through once, but we will -- I hear you on that.

MR. DERUSHA: And, Your Honor, we, of course, understand our ongoing obligation, and we do have that in mind.

There are two other issues that I want to touch on because there is some fairly significant things that the parties -- that the defendants have said in their papers that I want to address before we wrap up today. And that is, when there are joint investigations, there are two kinds of concerns that courts have identified. One is the scope of what the government is obligated to search for. We've been talking about that. The other concern is about whether there has been transparency with the parties about the fact that there is a joint investigation and the fact that there is the possibility of criminal enforcement when there is a civil matter going on.

And I want to address an argument that defense have made in the papers in the parallel civil matter that the

parties -- these defendants are being coerced into a settlement, which they say that entitles them to additional discovery in the criminal case. And I want to be crystal clear about this, that the criminal team here, although we have not separated for purposes of conducting a review for Brady information and for other discoverable material, we have not separated the teams for that purpose. We have separated the teams for purposes of litigating the civil case and the criminal case and for the purposes of, you know, the settlement is reached in the civil matter. We're not involved in that. There's a separate government team that's handling that.

But the defendants seem to be suggesting that the criminal case emerged only because civil settlement discussions had stalled and then the government sought an indictment for that reason, and they also contend that the civil settlement is a result of coercion in the criminal case. And these are significant things for the defendants to say. And I want to address this briefly, each of those points.

With respect to the civil settlement, if it is the position of the defendants that they are being coerced into entering into that civil settlement, I think they should say so to the Court today, and if that is their position, we would expect that they would walk away from the civil settlement. No party should enter into a resolution that they are not entering into freely and voluntarily, and they should not represent to

the Court, and as I believe they have in the civil case, that there is an agreement in principle.

On the other hand, if they do wish freely and voluntarily to settle the civil case, that's up to them, that's up to the civil attorneys handling the matter for the government, but they can't have it both ways, suggest that there's coercion forcing them to do something. If they are being coerced, they should not settle the civil case.

So I just want to be clear that we're not involved in those negotiations, to the extent they're ongoing, but it is certainly not a ground for additional discovery in the criminal case. With respect to the timing of the indictment, because this is important to us, that there be --

THE COURT: So I think you did a great job in your brief, and I don't have any issue with the timing of the indictment.

MR. DERUSHA: Okay.

THE COURT: I think you did a great job answering that.

So I would like to move on to 108 and hear the government briefly. And I'll just say, I don't really understand the legal basis for filing a motion for discovery for such an old administrative subpoena. I just don't -- I don't know if that's really proper to be -- for me to be treating it as a discovery matter in the criminal case.

MR. DERUSHA: Your Honor, I'm happy to address this briefly because I think it does boil down to just a few salient points. You know, we filed our motion as not a Rule 16 motion. We filed it pursuant to the statute that allows us to seek, allows the government to seek the aid of any court's compelled compliance with an administrative subpoena. It's obviously related to this case, and so we filed it on the docket.

THE COURT: Do you know of another case in which -- a criminal case in which something like this has been litigated?

MR. DERUSHA: I think the defendant explained it in the Insys case where there was a post-indictment subpoena. There was an indictment issued post subpoena. I'm sorry. A subpoena issued post indictment, and that was brought before I believe it was Magistrate Judge Boal in connection with that case. There was not a separate docket. And I think that sometimes happens in the context of, for example, it hampers orders where there are third-party subpoenas to collect information pursuant to a HIPAA subpoena, and I think those two end up filed, if they are related to a pending criminal case, on the docket of the pending criminal case.

But I think, Your Honor, really the issues boil down to just four points.

THE COURT: Can I just ask you again. Do you know of a case in which a pre-indictment HIPAA subpoena was then the subject of a motion during a criminal case? I just don't -- I

mean, again, this case just has so many weird twists, but it's just a very old HIPAA subpoena, and I don't know that I ought to be enforcing it here during the criminal case. You have -- I mean, the entity is a criminal defendant, right? And now I'm enforcing a very old subpoena against it during the criminal case. It just feels odd.

MR. DERUSHA: Your Honor, I'm not aware -- the government is not aware of a case that addresses this particular issue. I don't think the defendants are either. What they have cited, and they acknowledge that this is the case, that they're citing a case where there are subpoenas issued after the indictment. So I'm not aware of a case where that --

THE COURT: I'm just always really wondering whether there's no case law of this because it just isn't done. It's like no government lawyers have been trying to do this. This is like -- because I know the statute says any court can enforce it, but I just -- we are in the middle of a criminal case. So -- yeah.

MR. DERUSHA: Well, Your Honor, I say a few things. First of all, the standard that applies to administrative subpoenas is straightforward, and it asks whether the subpoena was validly issued. It was validly issued. There's really no contention about that here. It was valid when issued. And then -- but the rest of the analysis, which the case law Judge

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Burroughs set this forth in *Joint Active Systems*, which we cited, is a limited review, and asks whether the materials are material, and then if they are, the burden shifts to the parties subpoenaed to show that it would be unduly burdensome to produce them. Those are the only valid questions.

There's no authority that the defendant has cited, and there's no authority that we're aware of, that a validly issued subpoena expires most of the time. So we think those are the only questions that the Court needs to answer, and I suppose the reigning question, which is a logical one, is whether SpineFrontier has already complied with the subpoena. I don't think that there's any contention that they have with respect to the net sales data that is the subject of the motion. We've asked for that data. The company had produced a summary spreadsheet that showed both gross sales and net sales. It was a simple document, but it was produced by a lawyer for the company. And for a variety of evidentiary reasons, and to avoid litigating issues around who was producing it in what form, we requested that the company, which would be responsive to the subpoena, supply the underlying document that he or whoever created this document relied on.

What they gave us was half of the information. They gave us gross sales data, and those are contained on -- they're called usage forms that show a price. It's one figure. And there are a lot of those usage forms. There's a great volume

of them. But you cannot find both gross sales and net sales from one figure. It's just impossible. And so I don't think there's any question that Spinefrontier has not fully complied with the validly issued subpoena.

And the last point that I would say here, just to reiterate what we said in our brief, prior counsel for the company had told us that he was prepared to produce this material, had it available in a QuickBooks data file or something similar to a QuickBooks data file, and so we know that the data exists. We know that whoever created the summary chart had to consult something. We don't think the summary chart was inaccurate. We're just trying to address the evidentiary issue or the privilege issue or whatever else might arise from the fact that there's a summary chart containing this information.

To the extent that the sort of procedural issues stand in the way, we've suggested to them, to the company, that we would be content to accept a stipulation saying that that summary chart is admissible evidence and then nobody needs to produce anything further. They've already produced that chart to us, and that would fully resolve this issue.

We're really looking to be practical on this. The subpoena has been outstanding for quite some time. Your Honor is quite right about that. We have been seeking compliance with the subpoena for quite some time. And that has not always

been with current counsel, that's true. I made this point in our opposition. But we have sought this -- we, the government, have sought this information from a variety of SpineFrontier lawyers numerous times. We set that out in the briefing.

So I think I'll leave it there, unless Your Honor has any further questions.

THE COURT: No. Thank you.

And to the defense, what about just stipulating to the chart that your client previously provided? What's the problem with that?

MR. POLLACK: We're not in the position to do that at this time, Your Honor. What I will say is that there was a production in January 2022 of 31 thousand-plus pages by Attorney Weinreb and then nothing again on this issue until the letter that we received. And we've confirmed with Mr. Weinreb, and I think he would describe things quite differently than Mr. Derusha. There are factual questions here. I think that their burden is to show more than just a valid subpoena and a lack of a response when enforcing -- trying to enforce a nonself-executing subpoena. They haven't made remotely a showing of contumacy or what courts would say is required.

And they've tried to do it. I think they've said, look, we can file another proceeding. Well, they might be able to. And if they do that, people will address it as they file another proceeding.

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But, Your Honor, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure apply in this court, in this case for the benefit of all the parties, including the defendants, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure instruct this Court in Rule 17 how to handle subpoenas. It does not leave open the possibility of, well, you know, you can go to any court. Does that mean they can go to a small claims court and have a small claims court enforce the subpoena? I don't think so. I don't think any court in the statute means that Your Honor has to ignore the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in a criminal case and be the first court in this country to accept the invitation to enforce a three-and-a-half-year-old-plus subpoena served contrary to Department of Justice guidelines -- not served. I'm sorry. The attempt to enforce it because the position Mr. Derusha has taken is contrary to the language we cite from the Department of Justice guidelines about not -- not trying to enforce it against. It doesn't say you can't --THE COURT: Sorry. You lost me. MR. POLLACK: We cite to the Department of Justice quidelines on --THE COURT: Okay. MR. POLLACK: -- I had the page. U.S. page 6, right?

Next to 9-44 to 2025. "After indictment has been issued,

authorized investigative demands may continue to be used in

furtherance of an ongoing investigation provided they are not

directed to a defendant." So they're even -- I know that those are not binding and courts will often say they're not binding. But I'm not going to let somebody do something odd that there's no authority for that's contrary to the Department of Justice guidelines and then finds no home or basis in Rule 17 or other rule under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. And despite the word "any court," each court, whether a criminal court or some other limited court of certain jurisdiction needs to apply its procedural rules, and they do not include overriding the Department of Justice guidelines here to find some home in Rule 11 and 17.

And we do take issue, and there would be factual issues about what was produced and whether it's sufficient.

Mr. Weinreb would be willing to, I think -- we can provide more information about that. But this just seems like taking a stale subpoena.

Mr. Callahan was present when Your Honor asked if there was anything else that needed to be -- I think it was June 28th we had the hearing. We had our motion. We disclosed. We said what we were putting together. We came forward with it, and then they raised this issue for the first time two or three weeks later. I did want to end that there, unless Your Honor has questions about that.

But I did have one comment because there was something the government said on the last issue that I want to make sure

1 there's nothing in the record that misstates our position. We're not looking --2 3 THE COURT: If I could just ask a question about what you said before, before you say something else. 4 5 MR. POLLACK: Sure. 6 THE COURT: So you said Mr. Weinreb would be willing 7 to answer questions about what? 8 MR. POLLACK: No. I said. Okay. Mr. Weinreb --9 we've consulted with Mr. Weinreb about what took place, and he 10 would say there was no request made of him, I believe. That's 11 what we confirmed after the production of 31 thousand-plus 12 pages, and he understood it was done, right? And that based on 13 the discussions he had had, this issue was resolved, as we 14 understand it, and that would be January --15 THE COURT: So you are saying that the materials that the government is seeking are in those 31 thousand pages; is 16 that what you are --17 18 MR. POLLACK: I have not reviewed those 31 19 thousand-plus pages. 20 THE COURT: So did you talk to Mr. Weinreb, and he 21 said he thought the issue was resolved; and did you understand 22 that to mean that the information the government seeks is in 23 the 31 thousand pages that he turned over? 24 MR. POLLACK: The way the government frames it now at 25 this hearing, I'm not sure --

THE COURT: No, no.

MR. POLLACK: -- but at the time I understood --

THE COURT: Regardless of how the government is framing it now, when you spoke to Mr. Weinreb about what he turned over, is it your understanding he thinks he turned over the information that we're arguing about, at least here, and filing all this stuff about? Is it in the 31 thousand pages, Mr. Pollack?

MR. POLLACK: What we confirmed with Mr. Weinreb about was what happened then, and what we understood was that he had discussions with the government, he produced 31 thousand-plus pages that resolved what they sought. And until whatever it is, some 18 months later, is the first anyone is hearing that there was something missing from that. I do not know whether Mr. Weinreb reviewed the 31 thousand pages or someone in his office did to know whether how the government is defining net versus gross, what exactly is in there; that I'm not prepared to take a position on myself because I haven't reviewed it and I have not posed that question to Mr. Weinreb.

(Parties talk over one another.)

THE COURT: Okay. So what was the last point you wanted to make?

MR. POLLACK: So where the issue went on what would constitute *Brady* as a result of the overlapping or joint investigation, it's not just the internal communications. I've

looked back, and maybe there's a sentence in there that suggests otherwise, but categorically, we were looking for more information about how they interact and the nature of it, not a communication-by-communication log or description. So we wanted -- I think when Your Honor looks at the Bases case and Mahaffy and those on 16 and 17, you'll see the kind of information that just helps frame this. But what's missing is separate and related to the communications with each other, the communications with the witnesses and their lawyers. What I'm hearing from the government when Your Honor asked them if they searched things, it kept sounding to me like the answer was we do what we do in every case, and it wasn't a yes. And I do think they have to look at all of their communications. I guess the right time we issued subpoenas for communications --

THE COURT: So from receiving exculpatory evidence from the government in many cases that I get -- I would get emails from agents to prosecutors talking about something a witness had said, and if it differed in any way from some other thing the witness had said, that would get turned over. And sometimes it gets turned over right on the eve of trial because they're emailing in trial preparation and that type of thing. So my understanding is the government does review those kind of emails and communications, and if they're communicating directly with a witness and not through their lawyer, which I think would be kind of unusual but not unheard of, but anyway,

I'm assuming that they've done that.

MR. POLLACK: But I didn't hear him say that. I think their communications with counsel during the charged conspiracy period is --

THE COURT: You're talking about counsel for the witnesses and people they were investigating?

MR. POLLACK: Well, I'm making a similar assumption I think Your Honor made, that once someone is represented, the lawyers are probably not communicating with the witness, they're probably communicating with the witness's counsel, and maybe the agents are communicating with the witnesses. But as I said, the presence of counsel for each of these people becomes critical to us defending that at certain portions of a charged conspiracy period couldn't have been conspiring. It's a lawyer all over it for them, and the government is even interacting with them.

I don't think the government has said that it has looked at all of its communications with lawyers for witnesses or witnesses themselves and turned those over. And to the extent that there are lawyers involved, that by itself is <code>Brady</code>. And the more lawyers involved, the less likely they could prove that we are conspiring with a witness who's surrounded by counsel who's communicating with the government, and I think we get to see what those communications look like, particularly during the charged conspiracy period. We have to

defend it. How could we conspire with -- they gave one name of one of the several surgeons, but with that person in the weeks and months that he's represented by counsel communicating with the government, we get to see they're not just saying hello. I don't think we're just stuck in the final agreements. In this case where there are communications and drafts during the charged conspiracy period, drafts of agreements with these people going back and forth with lawyers during the charged conspiracy period, I can't see how that's not the epitome of Brady. And they have not said that they looked at that.

What they said was they turned over final agreements, not the underlying communications that would show counsel all over events during the charged conspiracy period, not drafts of them that would show the evolution of how some of these surgeons turned from people who said that they performed to people who didn't perform. And I think where it goes to the culpability of the potential co-conspirators, that's just Brady.

So that's where I'll leave it, Your Honor. I know
I've gone on, but it was said that we were just looking for the
internals. Yes, I think where there is an internal that says
I've communicated with that lawyer, here's what I told them,
we'd get that, too, because I think they were coordinating
things like that. But I don't want to lose sight of the fact
that they haven't done the fundamental task of looking at their

own communications and their agents' communications with counsel where it shows the presence of counsel during the conspiracy period.

THE COURT: Where it shows the presence of counsel for other people they're investigating during the period.

MR. POLLACK: This is the oddity that they didn't just investigate after the charged period. They investigated -- we're charged with -- I think you can read the charges that say we're charged with conspiring with Montone, and -- I'm forgetting the other name -- Carlson, who they mentioned, and others, and they're communicating with counsel affecting the events during the charged conspiracy period. At times someone becomes -- eventually someone who is doing what the government instructs and then they can't be conspiring with us, for instance. We get to see that.

And when counsel is present -- I mean, a jury could find we're not guilty for various reasons early on until some knowledge accumulates, but then at that later point, perhaps when the knowledge has accumulated of something, lawyers are already involved, and those people can't qualify as co-conspirators because all they're doing is what the government is asking or they're trying to work with the government. And besides which, lawyers are present, and we all know that is a theory of defense is it couldn't have been fraud, there are lawyers all around it. I know it might work,

it might not. It doesn't have to rise to the level of reliance on counsel, but lawyers being present and no lawyer raising a hand saying this is wrong, can be a theory of defense. So the fact that not only we have lawyers but these surgeons had lawyers and they're involved, well, during that period when they had lawyers, how can we be conspiring. The lawyers aren't saying don't talk to them, don't do this.

So I think they're just ignoring those types of areas beyond just the more complicated internal communications, which I still think they have to look at. And it might be that looking at their communications with these lawyers for witnesses would then inform a narrower way to go about looking for how they communicated internally about what they were doing with witnesses who are alleged co-conspirators during the alleged conspiracy period because that is really unusual here.

I have to admit that I've been involved in a lot of cases, and I haven't had the government so involved with so many alleged co-conspirators for a year and a half or more during the charged period. That's just an oddity. It happens sometimes at the tail end. It's limited. It's isolated. Here it just permeates more than a year and a half or two years of the charged period, and we have to defend that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. DERUSHA: Your Honor, I'm sorry.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. DERUSHA: Just on the government's motion to compel, I won't go back on the motion from the defendants. I think you understand our position on that, that we have not excluded anything on account of the fact that there was a joint civil investigation. But on the government's motion to compel, I just wanted to address briefly what counsel said about Mr. Weinreb's involvement.

Just to clarify the time line, Mr. Weinreb was counsel to SpineFrontier after the indictment, provided documents in response to our request after the indictment. It was a high volume of material. It took us some time to look through those materials.

I'm not aware of a single page in those 31 thousand pages that they're referring to that contained a second figure, net sales. If that data exists, we would be happy to be directed to it. We've asked the defendant, we've asked SpineFrontier to direct us to that if it exists. It does not exist, or at least if it does, nobody before Your Honor right now is aware of it.

And so we asked for the request to be met and for that data to be provided. And I don't think Mr. Weinreb would say anything different. But ultimately the issue comes back to whether or not the company has complied with the subpoena. The subpoena was validly issued when it went out, and the company has not fully responded to it, and I think that's all it comes

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     down to.
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              THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I'm taking this all
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     under advisement, and I appreciate everyone's fortitude this
     afternoon.
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              Thank you very much.
              And I'll try to move on this as quickly as I can.
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              Thank you.
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

I, Linda Walsh, Registered Professional Reporter and Certified Realtime Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and correct transcript of the audio-recorded proceedings held in the above-entitled matter, to the best of my skill and ability.

Dated this 16th day of September, 2023.

/s/ Linda Walsh

Linda Walsh, RPR, CRR

Official Court Reporter